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ARE PRIVATE PRISONS TO BLAME FOR
MASS INCARCERATION AND ITS EVILS?
PRISON CONDITIONS, NEOLIBERALISM,
AND PUBLIC CHOICE
Hadar Aviram*
ABSTRACT
One of the frequently criticized aspects of American mass
incarceration, privatized incarceration, is frequently considered
worse, by definition, than public incarceration for both philosophicalethical reasons and because its for-profit structure creates a
disincentive to invest in improving prison conditions. Relying on
literature about the neoliberal state and on insights from public
choice economics, this Article sets out to challenge the distinction
between public and private incarceration, making two main
arguments: piecemeal privatization of functions, utilities, and services
within state prisons make them operate more like private facilities,
and public actors respond to the cost/benefit pressures of the market
just like private ones. This Article illustrates these arguments with
several examples of correctional response to the conditions caused by
the Great Recession, showing how public and private actors alike
adopt a cost-minimizing, financially prudent approach, sometimes at
the expense of prison conditions and inmate human rights. This
Article ends by suggesting that, in a neoliberal capitalist environment,
prohibitions and litigation alone cannot improve prison conditions,
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and that policymakers need to consider proper market incentives
regulating both private and public prisons.
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They are telling this of Lord Beaverbrook and a visiting Yankee
actress. In a game of hypothetical questions, Beaverbrook asked the
lady: “Would you live with a stranger if he paid you one million
pounds?” She said she would. “And if he paid you five pounds?”
The irate lady fumed: “Five pounds. What do you think I am?”
Beaverbrook replied: “We’ve already established that. Now we are
trying to determine the degree.” 1

INTRODUCTION
Anyone seeking a reason to rail against the American correctional
system will find plenty of easy targets. With approximately 2.2
million people behind bars2—1 in 100 American citizens,3 with more

1. O. O. McIntyre, As O. O. McIntyre Sees It, MUSCATINE J. & NEWS-TRIBUNE,
Jan. 2, 1937, at 3. The anecdote has also been attributed to Bernard Shaw, Winston
Churchill, and several others.
2. Incarceration, SENTENCING PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/
template/page.cfm?id=107 (last visited Oct. 22, 2014).
3. Press Release, Pub. Safety Performance Project, U.S. Prison Population
Drops for Third Year as States Adopt New Policy Strategies (Aug. 8, 2013), available
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in certain states4—the American system is a frightening colossus of
confinement and the world leader in incarceration rates.5 Vastly
more people are under some form of correctional control—probation
or parole—raising the number of people supervised by the criminal
justice system to 7.3 million.6 Between 1980 and 2012, the total
number of state and local prisoners in the United States rose from
501,886 to 2,228,400—a 344% increase7—while the U.S. population
grew in the same time only from 226.5 million to 313 million—a 38%
increase.8 Shockingly, these numbers are not justified by the need to
control crime. Rather, crime rates have declined since the 1980s.9
Scholars studying the connection found little causal connection
between the increase in incarceration and the decrease in crime,
attributing only 10% of the decline, at most, to incarceration.10 The
conditions of incarceration, while diverse across the nation, are so
appalling that many state prisons and county jails are under some
form of federal court supervision.11 Most recently, the Supreme
Court found the physical and mental health care in California prisons
at http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/about/news-room/press-releases/2013/08/08/us-prisonpopulation-drops-for-third-year-as-states-adopt-new-policy-strategies.
4. Press Release, Pub. Safety Performance Project, One in 31 U.S. Adults are
Behind Bars, on Parole or Probation (Mar. 2, 2009), available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/about/news-room/press-releases/0001/01/01/one-in-31us-adults-are-behind-bars-on-parole-or-probation.
5. Incarceration, supra note 2.
6. Press Release, Pub. Safety Performance Project, supra note 4.
7. This calculation includes 319,598 prison and 182,288 jail inmates in 1980, and
1,483,900 prison and 744,500 jail inmates in 2012. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FACT
SHEET: TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS 2 (2013), http://sentencingproject.org/
doc/publications/inc_Trends_in_Corrections_Fact_sheet.pdf. During the same time,
the federal prison population grew from 25,000 to 219,000 inmates. NATHAN JAMES,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42937, THE FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION BUILDUP:
OVERVIEW, POLICY CHANGES, ISSUES, AND OPTIONS 2 (2014). Notably, however, the
prison population began to decline in 2009, the year after the Great Recession, and it
has continued to steadily decline since then. Total U.S. Correctional Population
Declined in 2012 for Fourth Year, BUREAU JUST. STAT. (Dec. 19, 2013),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/cpus12pr.cfm.
8. History: 1980 Fast Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
history/www/through_the_decades/fast_facts/1980_new.html (last updated Aug. 7,
2014). The current population is approximately 319 million. U.S. and World
Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last
visited Oct. 22, 2014).
9. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 49 (2006).
10. See DON STEMEN, RECONSIDERING INCARCERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR
REDUCING CRIME 4 (2007), available at http://www.thecommoninterest.org/docs/
VeraNewDirections.pdf.
11. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND
THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 13, 39–40
(1998).
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appalling—one inmate dying needlessly from iatrogenic causes every
six days12—indeed, so appalling that they could not be improved
Eighty thousand
without considerable population reduction.13
inmates are housed under conditions of solitary confinement,14 in tiny
cells with no outside stimulus,15 suffering abundant forms of neglect16
and deteriorating mental health.17 The United States is one of the
only Western industrialized democracies in which the death penalty is
alive and well, retained in thirty-two of its states.18 At least a quarter
of the United States prison population consists of nonviolent drug
offenders serving lengthy sentences,19 while the legacy of the War on
Drugs continues to fuel horrifying violence in the United States20 and
Mexico.21

12. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1927 (2011); JONATHAN SIMON, MASS
INCARCERATION ON TRIAL: A REMARKABLE COURT DECISION AND THE FUTURE OF
PRISONS IN AMERICA 133–35 (2013).
13. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1922.
14. Joseph Stromberg, The Science of Solitary Confinement: Research Tells Us

that Isolation is an Ineffective Rehabilitation Strategy and Leaves Lasting
Psychological Damage, SMITHSONIAN.COM (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.smithsonian
mag.com/science-nature/science-solitary-confinement-180949793/?no-ist.
15. Robert M. Ferrier, Note, “An Atypical and Significant Hardship”: The

Supermax Confinement of Death Row Prisoners Based Purely on Status—A Plea for
Procedural Due Process, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 291, 294–95 (2004).
16. Terry A. Kupers, What to Do with the Survivors? Coping with the Long-Term
Effects of Isolated Confinement, 35 CRIM. JUST. BEHAV. 1005, 1009 (2008); Josiah D.
Rich et al., Medicine and the Epidemic of Incarceration in the United States, 364
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2081, 2081 (2011).
17. Craig Haney, A Culture of Harm: Taming the Dynamics of Cruelty in
Supermax Prisons, 35 CRIM. JUST. BEHAV. 956, 956 (2008); Terry A. Kupers, How to
Create Madness in Prison, in HUMANE PRISONS 47 (David Jones ed., 2006).
18. Max Fisher, Map: Which Countries Use the Death Penalty?, ATLANTIC, July 6, 2011,
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/07/map-whichcountries-use-the-death-penalty/241490/; States with and Without the Death
Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/statesand-without-death-penalty (last visited Nov. 1, 2014).
19. See E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PRISONERS IN 2012: TRENDS IN ADMISSIONS AND RELEASES, 1991–2012, at 38 app.
tbl.5, 43 app. tbl.10 (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
p12tar9112.pdf; NILA NATARAJAN ET AL., JUSTICE POLICY INST., SUBSTANCE ABUSE
TREATMENT AND PUBLIC SAFETY 1 (2008), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/
images/upload/08_01_REP_DrugTx_AC-PS.pdf; People Sentenced for Drug
Offenses
in
the
U.S.
Correctional
System,
DRUGWARFACTS.ORG,
http://www.drugwarfacts.org/cms/Prisons_and_Drugs#sthash.WHjtG9jD.dpuf
(last
visited Oct. 22, 2014).
20. Meredith May, Many Young Black Men in Oakland are Killing and Dying for
Respect, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 9, 2007, http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Manyyoung-black-men-in-Oakland-are-killing-and-3299781.php.
21. IOAN GRILLO, EL NARCO: INSIDE MEXICO’S CRIMINAL INSURGENCY 116
(2011).
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Much academic and popular literature on American incarceration
frames its critique of this phenomenon in the context of what has
come to be known as the Prison Industrial Complex (PIC). Indeed,
the term returns approximately 555,000 results in a Google search.22
Here are some definitions of the PIC provided by advocacy sites:


[A] term we use to describe the overlapping interests of
government and industry that use surveillance, policing, and
imprisonment as solutions to economic, social and political
problems. . . . [Power over inmates] is also maintained by earning
huge profits for private companies that deal with prisons and
police forces; helping earn political gains for “tough on crime”
politicians; increasing the influence of prison guard and police
unions; and eliminating social and political dissent by oppressed
communities that make demands for self-determination and
reorganization of power in the US.23



[A] set of bureaucratic, political, and economic interests that
encourage increased spending on imprisonment, regardless of the
actual need. The prison-industrial complex is not a conspiracy,
guiding the nation’s criminal-justice policy behind closed doors.
It is a confluence of special interests that has given prison
construction in the United States a seemingly unstoppable
momentum. It is composed of politicians, both liberal and
conservative, who have used the fear of crime to gain votes;
impoverished rural areas where prisons have become a
cornerstone of economic development; private companies that
regard the roughly $35 billion spent each year on corrections not
as a burden on American taxpayers but as a lucrative market; and
government officials whose fiefdoms have expanded along with
the inmate population.24



“[A]n interweaving of private business and government interests.
Its twofold purpose is profit and social control. Its public
rationale is the fight against crime.”25

Eric Schlosser points out that “[p]rivate prisons are the most
obvious, controversial, and fastest-growing segment of the PIC,”26

22. GOOGLE (search term “Prison Industrial Complex”), https://www.google.com/
?gws_rd=ssl#q=prison%20Industrial%20complex (last visited Nov. 1, 2014).
23. What Is the PIC? What Is Abolition?, CRITICAL RESISTANCE, http://critical
resistance.org/about/not-so-common-language/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2014).
24. Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Industrial Complex, ATLANTIC, Dec. 1, 1998,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1998/12/the-prison-industrialcomplex/304669/.
25. Eve Goldberg & Linda Evans, The Prison-Industrial Complex and the Global
Economy, GLOBAL RES., (Oct. 18, 2001), globalresearch.ca/articles/EVA110A.html.
26. Schlosser, supra note 24.
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and indeed, these broad definitions frequently mention private prison
companies as the most salient example of its harms. In an eponymous
piece from 1998, Angela Davis writes:
Prison privatization is the most obvious instance of capital’s current
movement toward the prison industry. While government-run
prisons are often in gross violation of international human rights
standards, private prisons are even less accountable. In March of
this year, the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), the
largest U.S. private prison company, claimed 54,944 beds in 68
facilities under contract or development in the U.S., Puerto Rico,
the United Kingdom, and Australia. Following the global trend of
subjecting more women to public punishment, CCA recently opened
a women’s prison outside Melbourne. The company recently
identified California as its “new frontier.” 27

Indeed, critical prison literature commonly takes on private prison
companies, assuming that private incarceration is, by definition, worse
than public incarceration, both for philosophical-ethical reasons and
because its for-profit structure creates a disincentive to invest in
improving prison conditions. These concerns are reasonable and
understandable. The concept of private enterprises designed to
directly benefit from human confinement and misery is profoundly
unethical and problematic. But while I share the critics’ concerns
with private prisons, I think that focusing on private prison companies
as the source—or even the salient representation—of all evil in
American incarceration is misguided and myopic.
My concern with the critical movement’s focus on private
incarceration does not stem from wide-eyed belief in an unregulated,
free market’s ability to do well by doing good. Quite the contrary, an
unregulated correctional market is a sure recipe for the indifference
and cruelty we see in America’s prisons every day. However, the
focus on private actors as the bogeymen of American incarceration
belies a naïve understanding of neoliberal politics and a gross
underestimation of the extent to which everyone—private and public
actors alike—responds to market pressures and conducts his or her
business, including correctional business, through a cost/benefit
prism. This Article argues that the profit incentives that brought
private incarceration into existence, rather than private incarceration
itself, are to blame for the PIC and its evils. Further, these evils
cannot be remedied in full without carefully structuring incentives for

27. Angela Davis, Masked Racism: Reflections on the Prison Industrial Complex,
COLORLINES (Sept. 10, 1998), http://colorlines.com/archives/1998/09/masked_racism_
reflections_on_the_prison_industrial_complex.html.
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correctional agencies and institutions that prioritize the goals we want
to see manifested in the world, namely, recidivism reduction and
humane confinement conditions.
The Article relies on two main bodies of literature from opposing
political and economic perspectives: the progressive and radical
literature on neoliberalism, and the libertarian literature on public
choice economics. The literature on neoliberalism describes the
retreat of the state from its welfarist responsibilities and the
emergence of a disturbingly unmitigated form of capitalism.28 Public
choice literature exposes the ways in which public actors—
legislatures, judges, politicians, and other government agencies and
individuals—conduct their affairs under the same microeconomic
principles that have traditionally been used to analyze the behavior of
private corporations and businesses.29 While public choice economists
often write from a libertarian standpoint,30 celebrating the retreat of
the state and the power of the free market, one need not accept their
ideological premises to see the realism in their analysis. That public
actors, like private ones, seek to increase benefits and avoid costs, and
that they have no incentive to improve incarceration conditions does
not mean that such incentives cannot, or should not, be created.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I presents the classic
ethical and utilitarian arguments against prison privatization, relying
on a recent, much-publicized decision of the Israeli High Court of
Justice, which refused to allow the functioning of private prisons in
Israel. It then proceeds to provide theoretical background on the two
bodies of literature that guide my analysis: critiques of the neoliberal
state and public choice economics.
Part II proceeds to question the premise that private prisons are to
be blamed for a substantial part of the American incarceration crisis.
As this Part argues, focusing on private prisons gives them, at the
same time, too much and too little weight: too much because the
share of private prisons in the overall incarceration project is fairly
small, and quantitative analysis fails to attribute prison growth to

28. See generally JOE SOSS ET AL., DISCIPLINING THE POOR: NEOLIBERAL
PATERNALISM AND THE PERSISTENT POWER OF RACE (2011); LOÏC WACQUANT,
PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY
(2009).
29. For a comprehensive review of this perspective, see MAXWELL L. STEARNS &
TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009).
30. See Herbert Gintis, Beyond Homo Economicus: Evidence from Experimental
Economics, 35 ECOLOGICAL ECON. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 311 (2000), available at
http://tbauler.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/48548115/gintis_homo%2520economicus.pdf.
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private prison growth; and too little because focusing on private
prison companies misses the fact that public correctional institutions
are also, essentially, privatized in terms of most of their internal
functions.
Part III turns to public actors in the criminal justice system and sets
out to demonstrate how, against a backdrop of neoliberal politics,
they behave remarkably like private prison companies. This Part
highlights three aspects of the similarities: scandals emerging from
individual actors’ pursuit of profit at the expense of inmates, systemic
neglect and abuse stemming from cost/benefit analysis, and the
complicated relationship between public and private actors in the
aftermath of the Great Recession. This last aspect shows states and
private prison companies negotiating, wheeling and dealing, closing,
and repurposing prisoners, importing and exporting them across state
lines, as techniques to cope with the impact of the Great Recession on
the American correctional landscape.
The conclusions of this analysis are not all grim. It is possible to
create conditions that incentivize prisons, both public and private, to
improve incarceration conditions and to implement programs that
promote rehabilitation, reentry, and recidivism reduction. This
Article therefore ends by offering some suggestions as to the main
characteristics of such an incentive system and explains why it would
be superior to any effort to prohibitively regulate private prisons.
I. MAPPING AND QUESTIONING THE TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS
ON P RIVATE I NCARCERATION
A. The Ethical Argument
In 2005, the Israeli High Court of Justice was petitioned to rule a
new amendment to the Prison Ordinance unconstitutional.31 The
amendment in question allowed a private prison entrepreneur to

31. HCJ 2605/05 Academic Ctr. of Law and Bus. v. Minister of Fin. (unpublished)
[2009] (Isr.), translated at http://www.privateci.org/private_pics/Israel_Ruling.pdf.
Israel has no real constitution, instead “basic laws” that have constitutional power,
particularly “Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.”
As per the quasiconstitutional construct in this Basic Law, Section 5 disallows a “deprivation of
restriction of the liberty of a person by imprisonment, arrest, extradition or
otherwise” unless it is made (1) by law (2) “befitting the values of the State of
Israel[,]” (3) “enacted for a proper purpose[,]” and (4) “to an extent no greater than
is required.” Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, SH No. 1391 (Isr.),
translated at http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm.
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operate a private prison in Israel.32 The petition, on behalf of civil
rights organizations as well as potential inmates in the new prison,
presented various reasons for the amendment’s unconstitutionality.33
While the petitioning civil rights organization focused on the ethical
problem inherent in the privatization of punishment,34 the comments
on behalf of the potential inmates pertained to the concerns that
privatizing the industry would lead to a decrease in minimal prison
conditions. 35
While Israel lacks a formal constitution, it has a series of “basic
laws” of a constitutional nature, adopted by a supermajority of
lawmakers.
One such law is Basic Law: Human Liberty and
Dignity,36 which awards the rights to life and dignity,37 personal
freedom,38 and privacy.39 Any infringement upon these rights must be
done “by law that befits the values of the State of Israel, for an
appropriate purpose, and not greater than necessary.”40 Accordingly,
the Court set out to examine the purpose and the extent to which
human rights are infringed by the law allowing prison privatization.
Despite the fact that petitioners invited the Court to examine not
only ethical arguments, but also the actual impact privatization might
have on incarceration conditions, the Court chose to focus on the
former. Chief Justice Beinicsh argued that economic profit motives
are not the ones that the law would deem an appropriate purpose of
deprivation of rights,41 and that any extent to which people’s freedom
is restricted for this purpose is greater than necessary.42 The
concurring opinions also found that the law came up short of fulfilling
the constitutional requirements. Justice Procaccia’s concurrence
found that the purpose might be improving prison conditions by
relieving prison overcrowding.43 While Justice Procaccia deemed this
an appropriate purpose, it could be achieved via means other than

32. Id.; see also Prison Ordinance (Amendment No. 28), 5764-2004, SH No. 1935
p. 348 (Isr.).
33. HCJ 2605/05 Academic Ctr. of Law and Bus. v. Minister of Fin. at 37.
34. Id. at 36–37.
35. Id.
36. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, SH No. 1391 (Isr.).
37. See id. § 2.
38. See id. § 5.
39. See id. § 7.
40. See id. § 8.
41. See HCJ 2605/05 Academic Ctr. of Law and Bus. v. Minister of Fin.
(unpublished), at 54, 69 [2009] (Isr.).
42. See id. at 57.
43. See id. at 130–31.
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prison privatization.44 Justice Naor’s concurring opinion also argued
that the law is unequal in creating discrimination between public and
private inmates,45 as well as problematic in allowing prison providers
to profit from inmate labor.46
The sole dissenter, Justice Levy, argued that without empirical data
on the function and conditions of private prisons, determining its
impact on individual rights and freedoms was impossible. 47
The decision was widely lauded as progressive and revolutionary
among journalists48 and activists,49 and several academics expressed
philosophical critiques of private incarceration. Yoav Peled and
Doron Navot,50 as well as Avihay Dorfman and Alon Harel,51 have
argued that some governmental decisions simply cannot be executed
by private entities. Incarceration, as an expression of the public
response to criminal behavior, is one such function, as it is an
expression of the public will to punish, and as such could not be
privatized. 52
Similar ethical critiques of incarceration are offered beyond the
context of the Israeli decision. Michael Reisig and Travis Pratt53 rely
on Weber’s state rationality theory to point out that, because criminal
punishment is administered in response to violations of the laws of
the state, it is inherently related to the state’s power. They add that
the pervasiveness of punishment in America makes the coercion
involved in it even more closely tied to the state.54 This perspective
stems directly from Enlightenment-era liberal theories of the state,
none of which offered a basis for delegating what, by nature, is the
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See id. at 130–32.
See id. at 162.
See id. at 164.
See id. at 188.
See generally Prison Privatization Cancellation: Revolutionary Liberal

Ruling, HAARETZ (Nov. 20, 2009), http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/law/1.1291075.
49. See generally Einat Gal & Na’ama Carmi, Crime and Punishment: Privatizing
Prisons—Position Paper, PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS., available at
http://www.phr.org.il/uploaded/26%20novb04.doc.pdf.
50. See generally Yoav Peled & Doron Navot, Private Incarceration—Towards a
Philosophical Critique, 19 CONSTELLATIONS 216 (2012), available at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-8675.2012.00679.x/pdf.
51. See generally Avihay Dorfman & Alon Harel, The Case Against
Privatization, 41 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 67 (2013), available at http://law.huji.ac.il/upload/
privatization(1).pdf.
52. See id. at 72.
53. See generally Michael D. Reisig & Travis C. Pratt, The Ethics of Correctional
Privatization: A Critical Examination of the Delegation of Coercive Authority, 80
PRISON J. 210, 212 (2000).
54. See id. at 212.
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state’s response to a violation of its rules.55 Moreover, even from the
perspective of libertarian philosophies, individuals do not have the
right to harm each other; the necessity to do so has been delegated to
the state.56
Some ethical support for this position can be found in Norbert
Elias’ classical work The Civilizing Process.57 Relying on an
abundance of historical documentation, Elias argues that the
formation of the Early Modern states was characterized by a
sublimation of what gradually came to be regarded as base and
violent urges. Blood lust was tamed, more refined table manners
started to appear, and some bodily functions that were conducted in
public were relegated to the private realm. Social historians relying
on Elias’ analysis, such as V.A.C. Gatrell,58 Pieter Spierenburg,59 and
Robert Nye,60 have also associated the decline in disorganized
violence between individuals to the increasing power of the state.
Duels, for example, emerged to control and codify violence within
acceptable boundaries of honor and regulation. Gradually, as the
state took over punishment, such forms of individual-on-individual
recourse disappeared. These socio-historical works are, in a way, an
illustration of Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan61: the process by which
people give their power of aggression to the emerging modern state.
In the American context, there are other issues that make
privatization disturbing from an ethical perspective. As Michelle
Alexander argues in The New Jim Crow,62 there is a direct linkage
between the abolition of slavery and the exclusion of inmates from
the clause forbidding forced labor. Indeed, in the decades following
the abolition of slavery, the prison population, which during the civil
war was largely white, gradually shifted to over-represent inmates of
color and subject them to forced work practices not dissimilar to

55. See id. at 215.
56. See id. at 217.
57. See generally NORBERT ELIAS, THE CIVILIZING PROCESS: SOCIOGENETIC AND
PSYCHOGENETIC INVESTIGATIONS (Edmund Jephcott trans., 2000).
58. See generally V.A.C. Gatrell, The Decline of Theft and Violence in Victorian
and Edwardian England, in CRIME AND THE LAW: THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME IN
WESTERN EUROPE SINCE 1500, at 238, 239 (V.A.C. Gatrell et al. eds., 1980).
59. See generally Pieter Spierenburg, Knife Fighting and Popular Codes of Honor
in Early Modern Amsterdam, in MEN AND VIOLENCE: GENDER, HONOR, AND
RITUALS IN MODERN EUROPE AND AMERICA 103, 119 (Pieter Spierenburg ed., 1998).
60. See generally ROBERT NYE, MASCULINITY AND MALE CODES OF HONOR IN
MODERN FRANCE 39–41 (Judith Brown & Guido Ruggiero eds., 1993).
61. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Michael Oakeshott ed., 1962).
62. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 31 (2012).
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antebellum practices. Moreover, during the nadir of race relations,
private chain gangs proliferated, disturbingly resembling the private
profit involved in slave labor a few decades earlier.63 This disturbing
heritage evokes considerable discomfort with the idea of profiting
from human suffering which, in a different form, was a blight that still
casts a dark shadow on race relations in the United States.
B.

The Incentive Argument: For-Profit Incentives in the
Neoliberal State Lead to Worsened Conditions

The second argument frequently made against prison privatization
addresses the problematic incentives resulting from allowing
incarceration for profit. This argument is deeply rooted in critical
analysis of the neoliberal state.
The term “neoliberalism” was originally coined in 1938 to describe
fairly moderate economic policies, consisting of a free market with
competition, but supported by a strong and impartial state.64 Even
after the usage of the term declined in the 1960s, moderate
Democrats such as President Clinton and Vice President Gore used it
to describe their political ideology as late as the 1990s.65 The current
common usage of the term emerged in Chile, where it was used by
left-wing oppositionists to describe the free market regime advocated
by President Pinochet and his hired economic advisors, who were
Chicago-school libertarian economists.66 Since then, “neoliberalism”
has usually been taken to mean broad support for a capitalist, freemarket economy, and for a reduction in the regulatory power of the
state. Neoliberalism usually advocates for free competition and
privatization, as well as the removal of external controls of the
market, such as tariffs, standards, and restrictions on capital flows and
investment. With this ideology comes a call for a reduction in state
expenditures on social services, such as health and education, and a
shift in emphasis from communitarianism and interdependence to

63. See ALEX LICHTENSTEIN, TWICE THE WORK OF FREE LABOR: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF CONVICT LABOR IN THE NEW SOUTH 15 (1996).
64. See PHILIP MIROWSK & DIETER PLEHWE, THE ROAD FROM MONT PÈLERIN:
THE MAKING OF THE NEOLIBERAL THOUGHT COLLECTIVE 13–15 (Philip Mirowski &
Dieter Plehwe eds., 2009).
65. See David Brooks, The Vanishing Neoliberal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/11/opinion/11brooks.html?_r=1&amp.
66. See Taylor C. Boas & Jordan Gans-Morse, Neoliberalism: From New Liberal
Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan, 44 STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV. 137, 149, 152 (2009),
available at http://people.bu.edu/tboas/neoliberalism.pdf.
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individual achievement and responsibility.67
The assumption
underlying neoliberal ideology is that if the government and the legal
system refrain from intervening in free market activities, the balance
created by supply and demand leads to a healthy equilibrium that
happens on its own, invoking the “invisible hand” of the market—a
term coined in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations.68
Several commentators have observed that the state’s retreat from
its welfare and social functions is often accompanied by greater
oppression of members of the lower rungs of society, who are most
likely to find themselves criminalized. In Disciplining the Poor,69 Joe
Soss, Richard Fording, and Sanford Schram argue that current
policies addressing poverty governance are the result of a
combination of two ideologies: neoliberalism, consisting of a retreat
from welfare reform and a lack of commitment to combat property,
and paternalism, focused on infantilizing the poor and dictating their
courses of action. Similarly, in Punishing the Poor,70 Loïc Wacquant
ties the increase in incarceration in the United States to the turn in
American economics. According to Wacquant, punishment rates rose
not because of fear of crime, but because of social insecurities
brought about by the undermining of the class and race hierarchies.
As a result, the state has created a link between “workfare” and
“prisonfare,” penalizing property and expecting individual
responsibility despite systemic class differences and differences in
opportunities. Ironically, to Wacquant, the economic deregulation
and retreat of the state from its welfarist function led to an increase in
its punitive function, “managing” its poor through criminalization and
incarceration, rather than providing them with opportunities for labor
and mobilization.71
These ideologies, argue privatization opponents, play out in a
particularly destructive form in the context of prison privatization.
First, they make private incarcerating companies complicit in
overcrowding and mass incarceration. One argument is that private
prison companies are compensated on a per-diem basis: i.e. the state

67. See generally RICHARD H. ROBBINS, GLOBAL PROBLEMS AND THE CULTURE
100, 101, 135 (1999).
68. See ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, at book IV, ch. 2 (C. J. Bullock ed.,
1909–14). Note that Smith is often mistakenly associated with an aggressive form of
capitalism, when in fact he was very invested in the welfare state and its social
functions. See JERRY Z. MULLER, ADAM SMITH IN HIS TIME AND OURS: DESIGNING
THE DECENT SOCIETY 86 (1996).
69. See SOSS ET AL., supra note 28.
70. WACQUANT, supra note 28, at xviii.
71. Id.
OF CAPITALISM
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pays the company a price per-inmate-per-bed-per-day. Since a
certain number of inmates is necessary to make the operation
profitable, contracts between states and private companies often
specify the occupancy rate the state is obligated to supply. In that
form, prison population and incarceration become a function not of
crime rates and public safety, but of supply and demand and
contractual obligation.
Moreover, unregulated private correctional institutions whose
primary motives are profit are incentivized to seek it at all costs, and,
with a lack of a strong state regulatory power over their operations,
are likely to skimp and save on costly goods, services, and programs.
As a result, there are serious concerns that conditions in private
prisons will be worse, since unregulated private enterprises will
maximize their profit—and their bloated executive pay—at the
expense of the inmates. The state finds private greed difficult to
regulate because citizens repeatedly vote down bond issues that fund
prison expansion while at the same time demanding increases in
incarceration.72
Finally, a business model tends to expand and encompass new
fields; in search of new profit, private prison companies seek new
markets, such as the undocumented detention market. As David
Sklansky found, “crimmigration”—the criminal management of
immigration—has increased as a response to market conditions, and
not merely as a response to concerns about terrorism.73 In summary,
some critics of privatization point out its evils as embedded in the
overall structure of neoliberalism.
C.

The Efficiency Argument: Public Choice and Its Critics

A third set of arguments on privatization addresses the extent to
which it is more profitable for the state, as a whole, to run its
institutions by delegating them to private hands. These arguments
come from public choice theory, which is best defined as the
application of economic theory to the field of politics and
government.74 There is considerable diversity in public choice
literature; some writings accept some premises of microeconomics
without dispute, such as the assumptions of perfect rationality and

72. See DONNA SELMAN & PAUL LEIGHTON, PUNISHMENT FOR SALE: PRIVATE
PRISONS, BIG BUSINESS, AND THE INCARCERATION BINGE 43 (2010).
73. See David A. Sklansky, Crime, Immigration and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15
NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157, 193–94 (2012).
74. See Dennis Mueller, Public Choice: An Introduction, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC CHOICE 32 (Charles K. Rowley & Friedrich Schneider eds., 2004).
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perfect information, some dispute them and bring empirical
considerations into the analysis, some accept the premise that there is
social consensus about the “common good,” and some assume that
there will be competing concepts of the “common good” among
citizens and institutions.75
However, one characteristic of public choice literature is deep
skepticism about the typical distinction between the private and
public realms of law and of society.76 Public choice scholars analyze
the legislative process, judicial decision-making, administrative
regulation, and more using the same cost-benefit tools traditionally
relegated to the study of private markets. From this standpoint,
public choice often critiques the state for undue interference in the
operations of the market. It perceives “big government” intervention
as undemocratic in the sense that it immunizes itself and the
industries it regulates from being open to market considerations.77
This is not merely a democratic critique; public choice economists
believe in the positive contribution of market-driven competition to
policy development.78
In the specific context of prison privatization, public choice
economists usually support private enterprises, arguing that a
competitive marketplace in any field—including incarceration—
motivates efficiency.79 The sensitivity to market fluctuations means
that private companies can be flexible in response to correctional
needs.80 As one proponent argues, competition begets creativity:

75. Id. at 37.
76. DANIEL A. FARBER, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 1
(1991).
77. VINCENT OSTROM, THE INTELLECTUAL CRISIS IN AMERICAN PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION 6–8 (1974); David R. Morgan & Robert E. England, The Two
Faces of Privatization, 48 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 979 (1988).
78. KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 1–8 (2d ed.
1963); DAVID B. BOBROW & JOHN S. DRYZEK, POLICY ANALYSIS BY DESIGN 122–23
(1987); AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 1–2 (1970).
79. CHARLES H. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS: CONS AND PROS 76–118 (1990). This
perspective echoes arguments made by the private prison industries themselves. See
Don T. Hutto, Corrections Partnership: The Public and Private Sectors Work
Together, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Oct. 1988, at 20–22; Charles H. Logan, The
Propriety of Proprietary Prisons, 51 FED. PROBATION 35 (1987) [hereinafter Logan,
Proprietary Prisons]; Stephen Steelman & Kenneth Harms, Construction
Management Firms—Saving Time and Money, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Apr. 1986, at
64–66.
80. WILLIAM A. DONOHUE, THE POLITICS OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION 269–71 (1985); Logan, Proprietary Prisons, supra note 79; Joan Mullen,
Corrections and the Private Sector, NAT’L INST. J., June 1984, at 1–13 (1985).
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[A] contract to run a government program—say, a prison—only
specifies a basic service, but the agent can invest in thinking up
various innovations to the service. Some cut costs, some improve
quality. Appropriate some of the net benefit by renegotiating the
contract. Incentives are suboptimal, but at least better than those of
public managers, who have a more precarious bargaining position.81

Moreover, at least in the 1980s, the increase in demand for
incarceration simply could not be matched solely by the public
sector.82 Population reduction orders could only provide a temporary
relief for overcrowding, and more institutions would be needed in the
long run.83 The funding structure for private institutions, primarily via
lease-revenue bonds, meant that they could be built fairly quickly,
without being clogged in budgetary bureaucracy difficulties.84 Finally,
the different nature of private prison firms and public sector
correctional employee unions meant different abilities and incentives
to lobby for greater incarceration.85
Privatization, by nature,
fragments the market, which means private firms may have less power
and incentive to lobby for more incarceration.86 By contrast, in places
where correctional employee unions have been allowed to gain
considerable political power, they have been powerful players in the
state correctional policies.87
But not everyone agrees that prison privatization is necessarily
more efficient than public incarceration. Some critics of the
libertarian position argue that any savings on private institutions will
necessarily be only for the short term because the per-diem
compensation scheme requires that prison occupancy be maintained,
thus keeping population—and the costs of its incarceration—up, in

81. Alexander Volokh, Privatization and Competition Policy, in COMPETITION
15, 19 (Thomas K. Cheng et al. eds., 2014).
82. See Colson Charles, Alternatives to Reduce Prison Crowding, 62 J. ST. GOV’T,
no. 2, 1989, at 59–94 (1989).
83. See generally James M.A. Pitts et al., Contemporary Prison Overcrowding:
Short-Term Fixes to a Perpetual Problem, 17 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 124 (2014).
84. Dana C. Joel, Containing Costs Through Privatization, in HOW
PRIVATIZATION CAN SOLVE AMERICA’S INFRASTRUCTURE CRISIS 149-70 (Edward L.
Hudgins and Ronald D. Utt eds., 1992); Patrick T. Kinkade & Matthew C. Leone,

AND THE STATE

Issues and Answers: Prison Administrators’ Responses to Controversies Surrounding
Privatization, 72 PRISON J. 57 (1992); Dennis J. Palumbo, Privatization and
Corrections Policy, 5 POL’Y STUD. REV. 598 (1986).
85. See Volokh, supra note 81, at 21.
86. Id. at 25.
87. A classic example is the California Correctional and Peace Officers Union
(CCPOA). See JOSHUA PAGE, THE TOUGHEST BEAT: POLITICS, PUNISHMENT, AND
THE PRISON OFFICERS UNION IN CALIFORNIA 44–80 (2011).
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order to comply with contractual obligations.88 Moreover, some
questions are raised regarding the ability of a private industry to
employ the kind of economy of scale that would yield significant
savings.89
This raises the question of whether private prisons are more
efficient than public ones. There are several important considerations
that make such efficiency comparisons difficult. First, private prison
critics argue that the private prison companies that wish to present an
impressive bottom line tend to omit some of their costs, such as
salaries, from the operational costs of the facilities.90 Second, any
comparative analysis has to take into account that private prisons are
typically newer, and as such have to incur less maintenance costs than
older institutions.91 Nonetheless, there are a few dozen studies
comparing private and public institutions—enough to obtain a
general picture.
In a 1999 study,92 Travis Pratt and Jeff Maahs conducted a metaanalysis that encompassed thirty-three such evaluations of private and
public facilities from twenty-four independent studies of adult male
prisons.93 In comparing the efficiency of these institutions, they
controlled for differences in institutional characteristics across
independent studies, such as the size of the facility (economy of
scale), the security level, and the age of the facility.94 The dependent
variable was the effect-size estimate: the daily per-diem cost of

88. Patrick Anderson et al., Private Corrections: Feast or Fiasco?, PRISON J., Oct.
1985, at 32–41; Jeffrey R. Henig, Privatization and Decentralization: Should
Governments Shrink?, 12 PUB. POL’Y FEDERALISM 26–53 (1985); DAVID SHICHOR,
PUNISHMENT FOR PROFIT: PRIVATE PRISONS/PUBLIC CONCERNS 9–18 (1995).
89. Gary W. Bowman et al., Introduction to PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL
INSTITUTIONS 1–12 (Gary Bowman et al. eds., 1993); Dale K. Sechrest & David
Shichor, Comparing Public and Private Correctional Facilities in California: An
Exploratory Study, in PRIVATIZATION AND THE PROVISION OF CORRECTIONAL
SERVICES: CONTEXT AND CONSEQUENCES 133 (G.L. Mays & T. Gray eds., 1996).
90. GERALD G. GAES, THE CURRENT STATUS OF PRISON PRIVATIZATION
RESEARCH ON AMERICAN PRISONS (2012), available at http://works.bepress.com/
gerald_gaes/1.
91. H. Hatry et al., A Comparison of Privately and Publicly Operated Corrections
Facilities in Kentucky and Massachusetts, in PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 89, at 193–212. For an example of such a difficult
comparison see LeAnn Beaty, Privatization in the Last Frontier, 6 CASE J., Spring
2010, at 1, available at http://www.caseweb.org/journal_sub/TheCASEJournal
Volume6Issue2Case5.pdf.
92. Travis C. Pratt & Jeff Maahs, Are Private Prisons More Cost-Effective than
Public Prisons? A Meta-Analysis of Evaluation Research Studies, 45 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 358 (1999).
93. Id. at 363.
94. Id. at 362.
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operating the facility.95 The study found that ownership of the
institution, on its own, was an insignificant predictor of the
standardized measure of inmate cost per day.96 Other institutional
characteristics were much more significant: the inmate population
size, the age of the institution, and the security level of the facility.97
In general, in terms of per diem costs for maximum-security
institutions, private institutions did better, while public facilities fared
better in studies of minimum- and medium-security institutions.98 A
newer meta-analysis by Brad Lundahl, Chelsea Kunz, Cyndi
Brownell, Normal Harris, and Russ Van Vleet, also found no
significant difference in costs and savings between private and public
institutions.99 The analysis also found that the competitive market did
not create any improvements in terms of quality of confinement,
which did not differ considerably between private and public prisons.
Public prisons fared slightly better in terms of the skill trainings they
offered to inmates and had slightly fewer inmate grievances.100
The next Part of this Article will challenge the classic arguments
against privatization in light of public choice and neoliberal
skepticism of the public/private divide.
II. QUESTIONING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE
A. Private Prisons’ Share in Mass Incarceration
The political and scholarly energy invested in debating the merits
and shortcomings of private incarceration begs the question of
whether private prisons are the cause of the massive increase in
incarceration since the late 1970s. Progressive advocacy materials
tend to highlight the power and growth of private prison companies
like the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and the GEO
Group. Commenting on the Rutherford Institute website, John
Whitehead highlights the bottom line as a “$70 billion gold mine,”
and mentions CCA’s recent proposal to prison officials in forty-eight

95. Id. at 364.
96. Id. at 364–365.
97. Id. at 365. It is important to keep in mind that public prisons differ rather
dramatically along a spectrum of institutional ages and quality of incarceration. See,
e.g., JOHN J. DIIULIO, NO ESCAPE: THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 182–85
(1991).
98. Pratt & Maahs, supra note 92, at 366–67.
99. Brad W. Lundahl et al., Prison Privatization: A Meta-analysis of Cost and
Quality of Confinement Indicators, 19 RES. SOC. WORK PRAC. 383 (2009), available
at http://www.epsu.org/IMG/pdf/luhndahl-prisons-.pdf.
100. Id.
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states to buy and manage public prisons at a substantial cost savings
to the states—provided that these prisons contain at least 1000 beds,
and states maintain a ninety percent occupancy rate in the privately
run prisons for at least twenty years.101
Similarly, the ACLU report on mass incarceration bemoans its
“exponential growth,”102 pointing out that:
[A]s mass incarceration led to disastrous effects for the nation as a
whole, one special interest group—the private prison industry—
emerged as a clear winner. A massive transfer of taxpayer dollars to
the private prison industry accompanied the unprecedented increase
in incarceration and the rapid ascent of for-profit imprisonment.103

“Accompanied,” however, does not necessarily equal “caused,” but
in many publications this distinction remains blurry.
This is
particularly the case in writings examining the connection between
racial stratification and the prison industrial complex,104 as well as in a
report by the Progressive Labor Party, which accuses the prison
industry of being “an imitation of Nazi Germany with respect to
forced slave labor and concentration camps.”105 A causal explanation
can, of course, be provided. Joel Dyer’s The Perpetual Prison
Machine106 argues that the increase in prison population is a function
of three components: the consolidation of large media corporations
that sensationalize crime and violence content; the increasing use of
public opinion polling by politicians who wish to pander to “popular”
views about crime; and the collaboration between the state and
private corporations, who allow governments to expand incarceration
without the initial expenditure for construction. As Julia Sadbury
argues:
[T]he mutually profitable relationship between private corporations
and public criminal justice systems enables politicians to mask the
enormous cost of their tough-on-crime policies by sidestepping the
101. John W. Whitehead, Jailing Americans for Profit: The Rise of the Prison
Industrial Complex, RUTHERFORD INST. (Apr. 10, 2012),
https://www.rutherford.org/publications_resources/john_whiteheads_com%20mentar
y/jailing_americans_for_profit_the_rise_of_the_prison_industrial_complex.
102. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BANKING ON BONDAGE: PRIVATE PRISONS AND
MASS INCARCERATION 5 (2011), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/
bankingonbondage_20111102.pdf.
103. Id. at 12.
104. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 62.
105. Vicky Pelaez, The Prison Industry in the United States: Big Business or a New
Form of Slavery?, GLOBAL RES. (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.globalresearch.ca/theprison-industry-in-the-united-states- big-business-or-a-new-form-of-slavery/8289.
106. JOEL DYER, THE PERPETUAL PRISONER MACHINE: HOW AMERICA PROFITS
FROM CRIME 3 (2000).
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usual process of asking the electorate to vote for ‘prison bonds’ to
raise funds to build publicly operated prisons. Instead, they can
simply reallocate revenue funds from welfare, health or education
into contracts with privately run-for-profit prisons. Since the 1980s,
the private sector has allowed prison building to continue, even
where public coffers have been exhausted by the prison construction
boom. It has been rewarded with cheap land, tax breaks and
discounts in sewage and utilities charges, making prison companies a
major beneficiary of corporate welfare. These three components
constitute the “political and economic chain reaction” that we have
come to know as the prison industrial complex: a symbiotic and
profitable relationship between politicians, corporations, the media
and state correctional institutions that generates the racialized use of
incarceration as a response to social problems rooted in the
globalization of capital.107

There are very good reasons to be concerned about the effects of
punitive policies on communities of color, though a nuanced
approach to the racialized aspects of prison would not ignore the
spread of incarceration of white inmates in the heartland,108 nor would
it dilute the horrors of the “old Jim Crow” by drawing blanket
comparisons between the two regimes.109 Still, this popularized form
of blaming private prison companies in part for the ills of the prison
system is so common that it has been adopted, unquestioningly, by
the National Research Council (NRC) in its recently published report
on the reasons for mass incarceration,110 assuming that readers will
accept it as given:
By the mid-1990s, the new economic interests—including private
prison companies, prison guards’ unions, and the suppliers of
everything from bonds for new prison construction to Taser stun
guns—were playing an important role in maintaining and sustaining
the incarceration increase. The influence of economic interests that
profit from high rates of incarceration grew at all levels of
government, due in part to a “revolving door” that emerged
between the corrections industry and the public sector. Another

107. Julia Sudbury, Celling Black Bodies: Black Women in the Global Prison
Complex, 70 FEMINIST REV. 57, 61 (2002), available at
http://jthomasniu.org/class/687/Readings/women-global.pdf.
108. See MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF
MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 15–16 (2006).
109. James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New
Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 61 (2012).
110. See JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 126 (2014), available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=18613.
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factor was the establishment of powerful, effective, and well-funded
lobbying groups to represent the interests of the growing corrections
sector. The private prison industry and other companies that benefit
from large prison populations have expended substantial effort and
resources in lobbying for more punitive laws and for fewer
restrictions on the use of prison labor and private prisons . . . . Many
legislators and other public officials, especially in economically
struggling rural areas, became strong advocates of prison and jail
construction in the 1990s, seeing it as an important engine for
economic development. The evidence suggests, however, that
prisons generally have an insignificant, or sometimes negative,
impact on the economic development of the rural communities
where they are located.111

In his critique of the NRC report,112 John Pfaff mentions that it
cites numerous popular sources, with Ruth Gilmore’s Golden Gulag113
and Heather Ann Thompson’s Why Mass Incarceration Matters114 as
its only academic sources.115 The evils of private incarceration and the
pervasive incentives notwithstanding, it is important, according to
Pfaff, to keep in mind the share of private incarceration in the overall
correctional market. As of 2010, only 8% of prisoners were housed in
private prisons, about 7% in state systems, and about 16% in the
federal system.116 Of the thirty states that contracted out, the median
percentage of inmates in private prisons was about 10%, and no
state’s percentage exceeded 45%.117 The outcome is a concentrated,
but not monopolistic, prison industry.118
Elsewhere,119 Pfaff points out more problems with the theory that
privatization was a main contributor to mass incarceration. Not only
does the private prison industry house relatively low rates of inmates,

111. Id. at 164.
112. John Pfaff, The Flawed NRC Report: The “Prison-Industrial Complex” Part
1: Private Prisons, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 16, 2014), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2014/06/the-flawed-nrc-report-the-prison-industrial-complex-part-1private-prisons.html.
113. RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND
OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA (2007).
114. Heather Ann Thompson, Why Mass Incarceration Matters: Rethinking Crisis,
Decline, and Transformation in Postwar American History, 97 J. AM. HIST. 703
(2010).
115. TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 110, at 358–418.
116. Pfaff, supra note 112.
117. CARSON & GOLINELLI, supra note 19, at 9 tbl.7.
118. Volokh, supra note 81, at 24.
119. See generally John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Reasons of Prison Growth,
28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1239 (2012) (describing Pfaff’s general thesis and some of his
empirical analysis).
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it cannot in itself be accountable for even that percentage of the
incarceration market. While the industry has, according to a Justice
Policy Institute report,120 donated over $6 million to state races in the
last five election cycles, Pfaff argues that, based on the Institute’s
same source, these donations need to be considered in the larger
context of state lobbying and spending. He argues the funds provided
by private companies are vastly outnumbered by the donations of
public and non-profit lobbyists such as the educational lobby, and
total political spending ran $14.5 billion, a much vaster sum than the
private prison lobby’s contribution to political races.121
While Pfaff’s analysis ignores the fact that private prison
companies may choose to spend specifically on bills that push mass
incarceration,122 his conclusions about the percentage of private
institutions among all U.S. incarceration should give pause to popular
proponents of the prison industrial complex theories. Using Bureau
of Justice Statistics data, Pfaff charts the state’s rate of incarceration
growth between 2000 and 2008 as a function of the percent of each
state’s prisoners that are held in private facilities.123 He finds no
connection between percent of private inmates and prison growth.124

120. PAUL ASHTON & AMANDA PETERUTI, JUSTICE POLICY INST., GAMING THE
SYSTEM: HOW THE POLITICAL STRATEGIES OF PRIVATE PRISON COMPANIES PROMOTE
INEFFECTIVE INCARCERATION POLICIES 211 (June 22, 2011), available at
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/gaming_the_system.pdf
121. Pfaff, supra note 112.
122. See, e.g., Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, S.B.
1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
123. Pfaff, supra note 112.
124. Id.
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FIGURE 1. PRIVATE PRISONS AND PRISON GROWTH, 2000–2008 125

Pfaff’s chart raises a few difficult questions. The data depicts
prison growth in privatized institutions, but ignores the fact that many
of the inmates housed in Arizona, Oklahoma, Florida, and Texas are
out-of-state inmates imported to those states. It is unclear whether
his prison growth data attributes the numbers of those prisoners to
their state of origin or to the incarcerating state. This is particularly
notable in states like Hawaii, which incarcerates close to thirty
percent of its inmates in private facilities on the mainland.126
Despite these shortcomings and difficulties, Pfaff’s conclusion that
it is inaccurate to blame mass incarceration on the privatization of
prisons127 seems fairly sound. However, the conventional PIC
explanations are not only too cruel to privatization, they are too kind
to it. They focus on CCA and GEO as the be-all and end-all of
incarceration. Privatization mentality is much more pervasive and
intrusive, to the point that it is no longer easy, or sensible, to draw
firm distinctions between private and public prisons.

125. Id.
126. Gregg K. Kakesako, State Moves Closer to Reopening Hawaii Island Prison,
HONOLULU STAR ADVERTISER, July 9, 2013, http://www.staradvertiser.com/news/
breaking/214816621.html?id=214816621.
127. Pfaff, supra note 112.
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Even Public Prisons Are Privatized

The aforementioned decision by the Israeli High Court of Justice
was very adamant in its ethical condemnation of private prisons.
However, it explicitly noted that the unconstitutionality of the
amendment does not rule out any privatization of prison services
within a public prison, such as construction, laundry, feeding, and
other services.128
In her critique of the Israeli decision,129 Hila Shamir argues that the
opinion represents an antiquated and unsophisticated perception of
the market, which unduly distinguishes between the state and the
market, creating an unhealthy dichotomy between public and private
actors.130
Similarly, Malcolm Feeley has criticized the decision based on
empirical work conducted in Australian private institutions.131 Feeley
argues that the condemnation of privatization as an expression of
modernity is ahistorical and ignores multiple, accepted historical
examples of private criminal justice.132 Moreover, while Shamir
argues that the concept of the state as separate from the market is
unsophisticated, Feeley argues that the concept of the state itself is
flawed—the decision perceives the state as a Leviathan,133 rather than
the disaggregated group of different actors and sectors.134
These critiques of the private prison condemnation arguably fit the
American correctional market better than its Israeli and Australian
equivalents. Admittedly, the share of private prison companies in
owning and running prisons is much smaller than the popular
literature suggests. But to focus on this small percentage is to ignore
a vast spectrum of privatized, for-profit incarceration services that
have been privatized in public prisons. It is probably more sensible to
perceive privatization, not as an either/or option, but rather as a
continuum of private-sphere involvement in the provision of

128. HCJ 2605/05 Academic Ctr. of Law and Bus. v. Minister of Fin.
(unpublished), at 72 [2009] (Isr.).
129. Hila Shamir, The Public/Private Distinction Now: The Challenges of
Privatization and of the Regulatory State, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1 (2014).
130. See id. at 4.
131. See generally Malcolm M. Feeley, The Unconvincing Case Against Private
Prisons, 89 IND. L.J. 1401 (2014).
132. Id. at 1412–13.
133. Id. at 1415–16.
134. Id. Feeley also provides several examples of prison privatization success in
Australia and the ways in which private industries modernized an antiquated and
cruel Victorian infrastructure, in effect contributing to better conditions for inmates.
Id. at 1423–24.
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correctional services.135 Of course, private prison industries are
commonplace in public prisons as well as in private ones, and benefit
extensively from the competitiveness of prison labor.136 But many
other services within prisons, from food137 to rehabilitative
programs,138 have been privatized. The examples that follow illustrate
the extent to which private services have permeated public
institutions.
Perhaps the phenomenon that has received the most negative
attention recently is the privatization of health services.139 While
prisons have never excelled at providing health care to inmates, after
the Attica revolt, the provision of health care to inmates came to be
viewed as an Eighth Amendment right.140 Since then, however, the
overall neoliberal perspective on the role of the state has changed
dramatically, and its retreat from welfare responsibility on the outside
has clearly changed on the inside as well. This has included a
transformation in the perception of the inmate, from being ward of
the state to a consumer of services.141 As a result, public and private
prisons have narrowed their healthcare offerings to “bare life”
sustenance.142 One effect of the privatization of prison health care has
been muddled accountability for medical negligence, and, as Wil
Hylton has noted, many practitioners working for private companies
reportedly have had their licenses revoked in other states.143 Hylton’s
investigation of the prison’s approach to hepatitis revealed a strong
motivation to save money at the expense of providing inmates with
hepatitis treatment,144 which led to noncompliance with the Centers

135. See Norman R. Cox, Jr. & William E. Osteroff, The Public-Private
Partnership: A Challenge and an Opportunity for Corrections, in PRIVATIZING
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 89, at 113.
136. BARBARA J. AUERBACH ET AL., WORK IN AMERICAN PRISONS: THE PRIVATE
SECTOR GETS INVOLVED 113–29 (1988); WARREN I. CIKINS & JAMES R. SEVICK,
CONSTRUCTING CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES: IS THERE A ROLE FOR THE PRIVATE
SECTOR? (1987).
137. Warren I. Cikins, Privatization of the American Prison System: An Idea
Whose Time Has Come, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 445, 451 (1986).
138. Francis T. Cullen, The Privatization of Treatment: Prison Reform in the
1980s, 50 FED. PROBATION 8 (1986).
139. Wil S. Hylton, Sick on the Inside: Correctional HMOs and the Coming Prison
Plague, in PRISON PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES MONEY FROM MASS INCARCERATION
179 (Tara Herivel & Paul Wright ed., 2013).
140. Id. at 182.
141. HADAR AVIRAM, CHEAP ON CRIME: RECESSION-ERA POLITICS AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN PUNISHMENT (forthcoming 2015).
142. SIMON, supra note 12, at 71.
143. Hylton, supra note 139, at 182.
144. Id. at 185.
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for Disease Control’s protocols for treating the epidemic.145 Private
health care providers fiercely fight journalists who expose instances of
medical neglect in prisons.146 Paul von Zielbauer’s journalistic
investigation into Prison Health Services, a private prison provider,
exposed the problematic nature of private health care in local jails.147
Zielbauer recounts horrifying examples of neglectful healthcare,
which show that the hope of efficient care is shattered by scant and
unqualified medical staff and unpunished employee misconduct,148
prompting scathing reports by the New York State Commission of
Correction.149 It should probably be noted that inmates tend to be in
worse health than the general population, are more dependent on
alcohol and drugs, and are thus particularly vulnerable to faulty
medical care.150
One recent example of medical misconduct occurred when Nicole
Guerrero, a pregnant inmate in a public prison in Wichita County,
Texas, called for help when her water broke in solitary
confinement.151 A nurse working with a private prison provider, who
was later found to have had an expired license, did not heed
Guerrero’s plea for medical assistance, and the baby died shortly after
its birth.152 Guerrero is suing the nurse and Correctional Healthcare
Management, the private firm, for medical malpractice.153
Another industry within prison privatization that has been the
subject of abundant criticism is the phone company. Telephone
conversations from prisons include a variety of hidden charges,
including exorbitant connection fees and per-minute charges, which
invariably fall upon the shoulders of family and friends who are in
contact with inmates. This is a particularly important issue given how
essential telephone services are to inmates for staying in contact with

145. Id. at 187.
146. Id. at 200.
147. Paul von Zielbauer, Private Health Care in Jails Can Be a Death Sentence, in
PRISON PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES MONEY FROM MASS INCARCERATION, supra note
139, at 204.
148. Id. at 204.
149. Id. at 206.
150. See AVIRAM, supra note 141; SIMON, supra note 12, at 97; Zielbauer, supra
note 147, at 209.
151. Shelby Lin Erdman & Carma Hassan, Texas Woman Claims She Gave Birth
Alone in Jail, Baby Died, CNN (May 24, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/23/us/
texas-jail-baby-death/.
152. Alyssa Johnston, Lawsuit: Inmate in Solitary Confinement Says Jail Ignored
Birth, Leading to Baby’s Death, INDEP. MAIL (May 23, 2014), http://www.independent
mail.com/news/lawsuit-inmate-solitary-confinement-says-jail-igno.
153. Id.
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their families and to the system overall, given the importance of
family contact and visitation and their proven impact on recidivism
reduction.154 Supportive families of inmates cite the difficulties of
visitation and telephone calls as a hindrance and as a financial and
emotional hardship.155 There have been multiple litigation efforts
surrounding the excessive fares charged by private phone companies
contracting with public prisons, as well as efforts to regulate such
fares.156 Given these issues, and particularly the logistical and
financial difficulties in visitations, especially in remotely located
prisons,157 it should be a priority for public and private prisons alike to
make phone calls accessible.
A less visible private function is that of transportation companies,
which are private businesses that serve public and private prisons.158
The biggest private transportation service is Transcor, which is owned
by CCA.159 These transportation services have yielded several serious
problems, including dangerous driving,160 improper security leading to

154. William D. Bales & Daniel P. Mears, Inmate Social Ties and the Transition to
Society: Does Visitation Reduce Recidivism?, 45 J. RES. CRIME DELINQ. 287, 312
(2008),
available
at
http://jrc.sagepub.com/content/early/2008/06/04/
0022427808317574.short; Joseph P. Ryan & Huilan Yang, Family Contact and
Recidivism: A Longitudinal Study of Adjudicated Delinquents in Residential Care,
29 SOC. WORK RES. 31 (2005), available at http://swr.oxfordjournals.org/content/29/1/
31.short; Ryan Shanahan & Sandra Villalobos Agudelo, The Family and Recidivism,
AMERICANJAILS, Sept./Oct. 2012, at 17–24, available at http://www.vera.org/files/
the-family-and-recidivism.pdf. It is important, however, to mention that in-prison
contact can be problematic for recidivism if relationships are already poor. Nancy G.
La Vigne et al., Examining the Effect of Incarceration and In-Prison Family Contact
on Prisoners’ Family Relationships, 21 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 314 (2005), available
at http://ccj.sagepub.com/content/21/4/314.short.
155. See MEGAN COMFORT, DOING TIME TOGETHER: LOVE AND FAMILY IN THE
SHADOW OF THE PRISON 21–64 (2008); NANCY G. LA VIGNE ET AL., URBAN INST.
JUSTICE POLICY CTR., BROKEN BONDS: UNDERSTANDING AND ADDRESSING THE
NEEDS OF CHILDREN WITH INCARCERATED PARENTS 4–5 (2008), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411616_incarcerated_parents.pdf.
156. DREW KUKOROWSKI, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, PRICE TO CALL HOME:
STATE-SANCTIONED MONOPOLIZATION IN THE PRISON PHONE INDUSTRY 4 (2012),
available at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/phones/price_to_call_home.pdf; Ben Iddings,
Comment, The Big Disconnect: Will Anyone Answer the Call to Lower Excessive
Prisoner Telephone Rates?, 8 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 159, 189, 191 (2006).
157. CHESA BOUDIN ET AL., PRISON VISITATION POLICIES: A FIFTY STATE SURVEY
24 (2012), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Liman/Prison_
Visitation_Policies_A_Fifty_State_Survey.pdf.
158. Alex Friedmann, For Profit Transportation Companies: Taking Prisoners and
the Public for a Ride, in PRISON PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES MONEY FROM MASS
INCARCERATION, supra note 139, at 265.
159. Id. at 266.
160. Id. at 268.
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escapes,161 and even inmates being burned alive in a defective bus.162
Also notable are more than a few instances of sexual and physical
assault of inmates in the hands of private transportation employees.163
While public prison guards lobby hard to differentiate themselves
from private corporate correction employees, there is an increasing
market for training of public prison guards, including riot
preparation,164 with the addition of tourist attractions and exhibit
halls.165 These, in part, support industries of weapons designed to
quell riots and ease arrests, such as tasers.166
The conclusion to be drawn from these findings is that the public
perception of the prison industrial complex is both too grim and too
rosy. Contrary to some of the PIC critical literature, the share of fully
private institutions in the market is narrow, their impact on
policymaking is considerably smaller than perceived, and their
contribution to mass incarceration, while not negligible, fails to
explain the growth of the U.S. prison population or its oppression in
any meaningful way. However, expanding one’s perspective beyond
the particular companies that run entire institutions exposes a
spectrum of privatized operations in public prisons that are also
driven by profit motivations. Therefore, any ethical or utilitarian
ailment that can be leveled against private prison companies can also
be leveled against public institutions, which are increasingly private in
name only. Moreover, accusing private companies of profiteering
from the prison crisis—which is true, but a convenient scapegoat—is
taking the heat off the real culprits: states, and particularly state
prosecutors, who are the ones driving the prison crisis in the first
place with untoward punitive charging policies.167
But even this critique does not fully address the scope of the
problem. The distinction between the public and private sector is not
only futile because of the increased privatization within public
institutions, but also because it assumes that private actors are
motivated by different incentives than public ones. The next Part

161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 270.
Id. at 272.
Id.

Jennifer Gonnerman, The Riot Academy: Guards Stage Mock Prison Riots to
Test the Latest High-Tech Gear, in PRISON PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES MONEY FROM
MASS INCARCERATION, supra note 139, at 228.
165. Id. at 232.
166. Anne-Marie Cusac, Shocked and Stunned: The Growing Use of Tasers, in
PRISON PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES MONEY FROM MASS INCARCERATION, supra note
139, at 250.
167. Pfaff, supra note 119.
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relies on public choice insights to argue that, in fact, public actors
consider cost/benefit factors just as frequently as private ones, both as
individuals and on the institutional level. And as the incarceration
shifts following the Great Recession of 2008 have revealed, private
and public actors are negotiating, “wheeling and dealing,” in
remarkably similar ways, in mutual response to market pressures to
decrease incarceration.
III. PUBLIC ACTORS AS MARKET PLAYERS
A. Public Incarceration Conditions and the Ugly Pig Contest
In a symposium titled Capitalism, Government, and the Good
Society, political scientist and former North Carolina libertarian
gubernatorial candidate Michael Munger used a unique simile to
explain the choice between the state and private actors:
In North Carolina at the state fair, we have what in effect are beauty
contests for pigs. So you might imagine in one of the categories at
the state fair there is a Big Pretty Pig contest. And there aren’t
many entrants because there’s big pigs, and there’s pretty pigs, but
there’s not many big pretty pigs. So there’s just two; we have the
two entrants. The first one comes out and the judge goes, ‘Oh, God,
that’s an ugly pig! Let’s give the prize to the second one.’ Well, he
hasn’t seen the second pig. Now it’s true that the first pig is ugly.
But why would you have a decision based on the fact that there’s
problems with one system, the other one must be better? But that’s
precisely what people who want to reject market solutions in some
ways are advocating. So the world is imperfect, our knowledge is
limited, that particular pig of market solutions is in many ways
pretty ugly. The world is hard. The problem is that advocates of
state intervention often want to award the prize to the invisible pig:
the state. But when you actually take a look under bright lights,
government failures are just as ugly, just as prevalent, and in some
ways harder to control than market failures. 168

The comparison is hardly offensive, and possibly euphemistic,
when used to examine incarceration conditions. The serious critiques
leveled at private prison conditions are, of course, justified. Some
recent incidents include the disturbing audit conducted in October
2012 at the CCA-owned Ohio Correctional facility, which found

168. Michael Munger, Capitalism, Government, and the Good Society, ECONTALK
(Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2013/09/capitalism_gove.html.
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forty-seven violations of state prison standards,169 most related to
severe overcrowding of low-risk offenders under the supervision of
inexperienced guards.170 Similarly, Otter Creek Correctional Center
in Wheelwright, Kentucky, had its state funding pulled in August of
2012 after Hawaii removed all 168 female inmates it had housed at
the facility due to allegations of sexual abuse by prison guards.171 In
another egregious instance of private prisons run amok, GEO
removed its presence entirely from Mississippi in April 2012, after
Federal Judge Carlton Reeves wrote that GEO-run Walnut Grove
Youth Correctional Facility had “allowed a cesspool of
unconstitutional and inhuman acts and conditions to germinate, the
sum of which places the offenders at substantial and ongoing risk.”172
Among other appalling conditions, prison staff routinely had sex with
underage inmates, “poorly-trained guards brutally beat youth and
used excessive pepper spray,” and prison guards turned a blind eye to
inmates possessing homemade knives that were used in “gang fights
and inmate rapes.”173
But is this decidedly-very-ugly-pig that much uglier than its public
counterpart? In a 2005 article, Sharon Dolovich concludes that a oneto-one comparison of conditions in public and private prisons alike
raises serious concerns about both types of institutions.174 Here are
three more recent examples from a state that holds all of its in-state
inmates in public facilities.175 In 2011, the Supreme Court decided
what might be the biggest inmate human rights case of our time,
Brown v. Plata.176 The case exposed the abysmal quality of physical

169. Leigh Owens, Private Prison in Violation of Ohio State Law, HUFFINGTON
POST (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/09/private-prisonviolates-state-law_n_1951917.html.
170. MIKE BRICKNER, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF OHIO, PRISONS FOR PROFIT:
A LOOK AT PRISON PRIVATIZATION 18 (2011), available at http://www.acluohio.org/
assets/issues/CriminalJustice/PrisonsForProfit2011_04.pdf.
171. Brett Barroquere, Rural Ky. Town Readies for Private Prison Closure, FOX
NEWS (Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/04/24/rural-ky-town-readiesfor-private-prison-closure/.
172. Depriest v. Epps, No. 3:10-cv-00663-CWR-FKB (S.D. Miss. Mar. 26, 2012),
available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/order.pdf.
173. John Burnett, Miss. Prison Operator Out; Facility Called a ‘Cesspool,’ NPR
(Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/04/24/151276620/firm-leaves-miss-after-itsprison-is-called-cesspool.
174. Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437,
506 (2005).
175. California houses approximately 9000 inmates out-of-state in CCA facilities.
Prison Facilities, CAL. DEP’T CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION, http://www.cdcr.
ca.gov/Visitors/CA_Out_Of_State_Facilities.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2014).
176. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
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and mental healthcare provided in public California prisons. Justice
Kennedy, writing the Opinion of the Court on behalf of five Justices,
detailed numerous horrific instances of systemic indifference,
resulting in inmates sitting in their own human waste for hours,
injuries and chronic conditions becoming worse and worse through
medical neglect and maltreatment, and unnecessary, iatrogenic deaths
at a rate of an inmate every six days.177 It is particularly poignant that
these practices were so horrifying that, years before the decision, the
courts had taken the prison health care system out of the hands of the
state and placed it in the hands of a federal receiver178—but even that
was not enough.179 Justice Kennedy grimly concluded:
To incarcerate, society takes from prisoners the means to provide
for their own needs. Prisoners are dependent on the State for food,
clothing, and necessary medical care. A prison’s failure to provide
sustenance for inmates “may actually produce physical ‘torture or a
lingering death.’” Just as a prisoner may starve if not fed, he or she
may suffer or die if not provided adequate medical care. A prison
that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, including adequate
medical care, is incompatible with the concept of human dignity and
has no place in civilized society. If the government fails to fulfill this
obligation, the courts have a responsibility to remedy the resulting
Eighth Amendment violation.180

Federal courts are currently in the process of hearing another
lawsuit, Ashker v. Brown,181 which addresses the practice of solitary
confinement in California. In 2011 and 2013, inmates in California’s
Pelican Bay and Corcoran institutions, as well as in other public
correctional facilities, engaged in hunger strikes to protest against the
conditions in the Security Housing Unit (SHU).182 These conditions
included placement in small solitary cells for twenty-three hours a day

177. Id. For more on healthcare in California prisons, see SIMON, supra note 12, at
133–54.
178. CAL. CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE SERVICES, http://www.cphcs.ca.gov/ (last
visited Oct. 23, 2014).
179. MAC TAYLOR, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, PROVIDING CONSTITUTIONAL
AND COST-EFFECTIVE INMATE MEDICAL CARE 11–15 (2012), available at
http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2012/crim/inmate-medical-care/inmate-medical-care041912.pdf.
180. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1928 (citations omitted).
181. Ashker v. Brown, No. C 09-5796 CW, 2013 WL 1701702, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
18, 2013).
182. Sept. 6th Event: Anniversary of Suspension of Historic 2013 Hunger Strike,
PRISONER HUNGER STRIKE SOLIDARITY (Aug. 17, 2014), http://prisonerhunger
strikesolidarity.wordpress.com/2014/08/17/sept-6th-event-anniversary-of-suspensionof-historic-2013-hunger-strike/.
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with no human contact for an indefinite period of time—sometimes
lasting decades183—not for disciplinary violations, but for a suspicion
of gang membership.184 The hunger strike ended only when Judge
Thelton Henderson ordered that the inmates be force-fed.185
In 2013, an exposé by the Center for Investigative Reporting
uncovered a scandal of massive proportions: the sterilization of
female inmates without proper state procedures.186 A subsequent
2014 California Auditor examination uncovered 144 cases of tubal
ligations performed in inmates between 2006 and 2010, thirty-nine of
which were performed without consent and a further twenty-seven in
which the inmates’ physicians did not sign the appropriate forms.187
Interviews with the inmates that had undergone the procedure reveal
disturbing degrees of paternalism and pressure on the part of medical
staff. “As soon as [the institution’s OB-GYN] found out that I had
five kids,” recounted an inmate to the Sacramento Bee, “he suggested
that I look into getting it done. The closer I got to my due date, the
more he talked about it. . . . He made me feel like a bad mother if I
didn’t do it.”188
Many more examples of cruelty, laziness, and neglect in public
prisons lead to the inevitable conclusion: incarceration conditions in
the United States may differ across states and different types of
institutions, but it is difficult to argue that private institutions,
categorically, are worse than public ones. Both pigs are ugly. And as
the next Subsection shows, criminal justice actors in the public sector
are not at all immune from profit motivations when they engage in
unconscionable behavior toward the people subjected to their control.

183. For a full account of the conditions in the SHU and the hunger strike that
resulted, see Benjamin Wallace-Wells, The Plot from Solitary, N.Y. MAG. (Feb. 26,
2014), http://nymag.com/news/features/solitary-secure-housing-units-2014-2/.
184. See Keramet A. Reiter, Parole, Snitch, or Die: California’s Supermax Prisons
and Prisoners, 1997–2007, 14 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 530, 542 (2012).
185. See California Hunger Strike: Judge Approves Force-Feeding of Prisoners,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/20/
california-hunger-strike-force-feeding.
186. See Corey G. Johnson, Female Inmates Sterilized in California Prisons
Without Approval, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 7, 2013, http://www.sacbee.com/news/
local/health-and-medicine/article2578036.html.
187. CAL. STATE AUDITOR, STERILIZATION OF FEMALE INMATES 19 (2014),
available at http://www.auditor.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2013-120.pdf.
188. Johnson, supra note 186.
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Profit-Seeking Aberrations and the Banality of Evil

In 2008, many conscientious Americans were shocked to discover
that two Philadelphia judges—Mark Ciavarella, the former President
Judge of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, and Michael
Conahan, a Senior Judge in the same county—were indicted and
convicted for accepting money from a private juvenile facility
provider, Robert Mericle, in return for sentencing thousands of
juvenile defendants harshly so they would be sent to the provider’s
detention centers.189 Mericle, a real-estate developer, was a staunch
supporter of Ciavarella’s election campaign,190 and Conahan struck a
personal friendship with some organized crime leaders in Northeast
Pennsylvania.191
The defendants’ association with Mericle started with their support
of cash for his juvenile facility venture in 2000–2001,192 and continued
with their furnishing of Mericle’s facilities with revenue-raising
bodies.193 Examples of their harsh sentencing for kickback included
seven weeks detention for a thirteen-year-old’s minor violent
incidents with his mother’s much-larger boyfriend,194 months of house
arrest in anticipation of a confinement sentence for an epileptic
fourteen-year-old girl accused of defacing stop signs with the
inscription “vote for Michael Jackson,”195 a sixteen-year-old charged
with “terroristic threats” for a prank and sentenced to an indefinite
term at a privately-funded wilderness camp for girls,196 and a fifteenyear-old who carelessly and mistakenly purchased a stolen motorbike
sent to a term at a “boot camp” which led him to use drugs and
exhibit signs of anxiety and depression, which brought him in and out
of detention facilities for three years.197 While many of these
sentences directly lined the judges’ pockets, some of them are more
indirectly related to the kickbacks, and represent the indifference and
cruelty that set in once they got used to commodifying human life.

189. See generally WILLIAM ECENBARGER, KIDS FOR CASH: TWO JUDGES,
THOUSANDS OF CHILDREN, AND A $2.6 MILLION KICKBACK SCHEME (2012)
(providing an engaging overview of the case).
190. Id. at 32.
191. Id. at 33.
192. Id. at 44–45.
193. Id. at 47.
194. Id. at 1–4.
195. Id. at 5–6
196. Id. at 7–9.
197. Id. at 10–12.
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The Juvenile Law Center found that hundreds of defendants were
tried without receiving proper counsel.198
Clearly, a serious culprit in this scandal is Robert Mericle, the
juvenile facility provider, who paid the judges’ kickbacks. One
possible reading of this story is as an indictment against such
institutions. But in an environment in which public officials are not
greedy, corrupt, and profit-seeking, a for-profit attempt to corrupt
judges would not result in such horrific results. William Ecenbager
provides background that includes a lengthy history of political
corruption,199 the judicial election system in thirty-nine states—
including Pennsylvania200—and the “tough love” change in the
American approach to juvenile justice.201 In his account of the
scandal, Ecenbager shows that pressures were exerted by the judges
over the entire juvenile system in Pennsylvania, bullying lawyers and
therapeutic personnel to collaborate with their schemes, sometimes
openly stating that these policies were necessary because there were
“bills to pay.”202
Scandalous human rights crimes perpetrated for profit do not even
require the partnership of a private actor; sometimes, a legislative
lacuna suffices. A 1939 Alabama law allowed the state’s sixty-seven
sheriffs to pocket any leftover money they managed to save from the
state’s allowance for feeding inmates in local institutions.203 In 2009,
then-sheriff of Morgan County, Greg Bartlett, was charged and
convicted for having pocketed $212,000 from the prison’s food
budget, while the inmates were provided with inadequate food on
$1.75 a day.204 His defense attorney argued that “everything he [had]
done [was] by the rules, including the feeding allowance.”205 After
Bartlett’s release from jail, he agreed to spend the food money solely
on food and not keep any funds for his personal use.206 Currently,
Sheriff Mike Rainey, who is calling on the legislature to end the
198. Id. at 154.
199. Id. at 17–25.
200. Id. at 30–31.
201. Id. at 38–40.
202. Id. at 49–50.
203. See ALA. CONST. amend. XLIV; ALA. CODE § 36-22-17 (1975).
204. Adam Nossiter, As His Inmates Grew Thinner, a Sheriff’s Wallet Grew
Fatter, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/09/us/09
sheriff.html.
205. Id.
206. See Maynor v. Morgan County, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (N.D. Ala. 2001). For
journalistic commentaries, see Shelly Haskins, Sheriff Greg Bartlett to Speak on Jail
Food Issue, AL.COM BLOG (Jan. 9, 2009, 1:23 PM), http://blog.al.com/breaking/2009/
01/sheriff_greg_bartlett_to_speak.html.
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current system and allow county commissions to oversee the funds,
has reportedly been donating most of his potential earnings to charity,
to the tune of $10,000.207
One would hope that Rainey’s public stance be the norm, rather
than notable and unusual honesty, and that Bartlett’s deeds be
exposed for the travesty they are. However, Bartlett was defended in
his trial by the Alabama Sheriffs’ Association, who stressed in his
defense that he had not broken any laws, but merely exploited an
existing system.208 And when local advocacy groups sought to find out
how common this profiteering-on-food scheme was, the Director of
the Alabama Sheriffs’ Association sent each sheriff a letter advising
them to ignore the open records law.209
Sarah Geraghty and Melanie Velez provide other examples of such
enrichment: In South Georgia, Clinch County court officials had
charged state court misdemeanants $10–15 in illegal fees, which were
pocketed by court personnel.210 Interpreting these incidents as
endemic to the Southern system does not obscure the fact that they
consisted of exploiting an opaque system riddled with antiquated law
to obtain personal profit.
Lest it seem that these are extreme, idiosyncratic examples of
cruelty and corruption, let us turn to much more ordinary profitseeking mechanisms of exploitation. On May 15, 2014, the California
legislature approved AB 1876, a bill designed to put an end to any
prevailing practice among county correctional officers to profiteer
from contracts with phone companies. The new bill “prohibits a
contract to provide telephone services to any person detained or
sentenced to a jail or juvenile facility from including any commission
or other payment . . . to the entity operating the jail or juvenile
facility.”211
The bill was designed to address a county loophole in phone
contract regulation in local facilities. In 2007, California passed a law
phasing in reductions in the cost of prison phone calls, but it left the

207. See Adam Peck, In Alabama Prisons, the Less Sheriffs Spend on Food for
Inmates, the More They Earn, THINK PROGRESS (June 25, 2013), http://think
progress.org/justice/2012/06/25/506089/in-alabama-prisons-the-less-sheriffs-spend-onfood-for-inmates-the-more-they-earn/.
208. Id.
209. See Sarah Geraghty & Melanie Velez, Bringing Transparency and
Accountability to Criminal Justice Institutions in the South, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 455, 464–65 (2011).
210. Id.
211. Assemb. B. 1876, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014), available at
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140AB1876.
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county jail market open to abuse and exploitation.212 For example, in
Contra Costa County, phone call rates amounted to triple what the
state had put in place for state-owned facilities, and the commissions
paid by the operator to the county were fifty-three percent.213 The
money was reportedly directed to an “inmate welfare” fund, some of
which was used for worthwhile programming, but, as commented in
the Contra Costa Times, obtaining it via a profit-seeking kickback
was a function of corrupt management.214 Similarly, the 2007 law
pertaining to state prisons did not cover interstate-calling costs,
making those prohibitively expensive and contact with out-of-state
family virtually impossible for low-income families.215
Similar
schemes that make phone calls prohibitively expensive, for prison
authority profit, are the subject of civil rights campaigns in Virginia216
and in the federal system.217
These individuals and institutions were clearly operating with the
intention to profit from their misdeeds. That they were public
officials, or public institutions, did not make them immune to greed or
more sensitive to human suffering than their private counterparts.
Indeed, much more mundane examples of “wheeling and dealing”
demonstrate that, when public and private actors are faced with a
shift in the profitability or sustainability of incarceration, they
transform their behavior and adapt to the changing market conditions
in surprisingly similar ways.
This phenomenon can be illustrated by examining the changes in
incarceration policies and practices following the Great Recession of
2008.218 When incarceration became less sustainable and states began
to feel the pressure to reduce their prison populations, private prison
212. S.B. 81, 2007–2008 (Cal. 2007), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/sen/
sb_0051-0100/sb_81_bill_20070824_chaptered.html.
213. Tracy Rosenberg, County Allows Outrageous Charges for Inmate Calls,
CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Feb. 23, 2013, http://www.contracostatimes.com/ci_22640254/
tracy-rosenberg-county-allows-outrageous-charges-inmate-calls.
214. Id.
215. Tracy Rosenberg, A Tale of Two Prisoners, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 8, 2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tracy-rosenberg/a-tale-of-two-prisoners_b_
4552343.html.
216. See, e.g., Campaign for Prison Phone Justice, NATION INSIDE,
http://nationinside.org/campaign/prison-phone-justice/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2014).
217. Justin Moyer, After Almost a Decade, FCC Has Yet to Rule on High Cost of
Prison Phone Calls, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/after-almost-a-decade-fcc-has-yet-to-rule-on-high-cost-of-prison-phonecalls/2012/12/02/b11ea164-2daf-11e2-9ac2-1c61452669c3_story.html.
218. See AVIRAM, supra note 141; Hadar Aviram, The Inmate Export Business
and Other Financial Adventures: Correctional Policies for Times of Austerity, 11
HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 111, 115–33 (2014).
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companies offered their public clients “discounts” on the required
occupancy rates in their institutions,219 while at the same time
“diversifying their incarceration portfolio” by entering the
undocumented immigrant detention market and advocating for antiimmigration legislation.220 Responding to the same pressures, states
turned to prison closures.221 States that managed to reduce their
population tried to sell their unused correctional space to other
states.222 States made decisions about housing inmates in state, or outof-state based on cost-benefit considerations.223
Public and private actors alike, we can conclude, negotiate with
each other, and with other actors, in order to respond to economic
pressure. Private prison companies are changing their contracts with
state and local governments to account for lesser occupancy, and
states buy and sell prison space from each other. Not only are these
two “pigs” so ugly that they defy comparison, they are both motivated
by profit and cost-benefit analysis like the neoliberal subjects they
are.
CONCLUSION
This Article’s journey into the inner workings of private and public
correctional agencies leads to the inescapable conclusion that PIC
critics who focus on private prison companies are missing the mark.
By focusing specifically on private incarceration, they reinforce the
traditional public/private divide, ignoring the realities of a fragmented
market as well as a fragmented state. Public institutions have
privatized so many of their internal functions that they can hardly be
differentiated from private ones. Public actors behave in ways
equally as atrocious and neglectful, and they respond to the same
market pressure as their private counterparts.
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A sober public choice perspective on incarceration (albeit one that
does not necessarily subscribe to the political preferences of public
choice) requires that critical prison literature abandon fantasy and
acknowledge reality; fighting private incarceration companies is not
only futile, but also misses the mark. The problem is not the
institutions themselves, but rather the fact that they cannot escape the
neoliberal economy in which they operate.
Calling attention to the horrifying, inhumane consequences of
these market pressures is important, but so is designing solutions that
might work. Since the capitalist makeup of the state, and its
contribution to the PIC, cannot be dismantled by raising
consciousness to humanitarian concerns, the regulation correctional
behavior must be altered so that it provides incentives to improve
prison conditions.
One such alteration might be shifting the compensation basis for all
correctional institutions—private and public alike—from a per-diem
basis to a recidivism-reduction basis. In other words, inmate
recidivism will be measured for each correctional institution,
regardless of its management, and these institutions will be
compensated and budgeted according to their accomplishments in
recidivism reduction.
Such a system would prompt prison
administrations to adopt rehabilitation programs proven to work and
to seek reentry schemes for their inmates that will improve their lives
overall and reduce the chance that they will return to prison. It will
also sever the link between better business and a larger number of
inmates, and eliminate the incentive for lobbying for “tough on
crime” propositions by public and private actors alike.
In crafting this system, care must be taken to avoid a situation in
which unsuccessful prisons simply close and all inmates are shuttled
to successful prisons, making the latter, over time, overcrowded and
unsuccessful. This incentive structure must be accompanied by a plan
to heal troubled prisons, which should include resources for
implementing proven vocational and educational training programs.
Everyone should be offered an opportunity to succeed in recidivism
reduction. Care must also be taken to foresee efforts to “game” the
new system by admitting solely inmates who have better rehabilitative
chances, by requiring that facilities accept inmates in their relevant
security level on a random allocation basis.
If, in light of such alterations in the compensation scheme, private
prison companies decide that their business is no longer profitable,
their exit from the field will not be mourned. But if, indeed, private
entrepreneurs respond better to financial initiatives than to
accusations and limitations, let us push everyone in the correctional
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business, whether they wear badges or business suits, to do well by
doing good.

